Mitsein / Mitwelt
Dasein's world is always shared: to be in the world is to be with other beings, not a solitary subject.
In lecture order, as Marci Shore presents each view. The time opens that minute of the lecture on YouTube.
Dasein is no detached observer. It is always already being-in-the-world: doing things, caring about things, alongside other beings, with no outside position to withdraw to.
Put simply Heidegger: we are never detached observers. We are always already "in the world": doing things, caring about things, living among others, with nowhere outside to step back to.
Nobody is thrown into an empty world. For Heidegger, other people belong to Dasein's situation from the outset, so existing in the world already means existing alongside others.
Put simply Heidegger: you never start out alone. From the moment you exist, other people are already part of your world.
On Shore's gloss, Heidegger's picture puts intersubjectivity, in some sense, ahead of subjectivity: there is never a Dasein that is not already among other people.
Put simply Shore's reading of Heidegger: in a sense, relating to others comes before having a self, since you are always already in a world shared with other people.
Links from these claims to others in the course. Each shows the earlier claim, then the later one that answers it. “Our inference” marks a link Shore does not state outright.
HeideggerDasein is no detached observer. It is always already being-in-the-world: doing things, caring about things, alongside other beings, with no outside position to withdraw to. L12 · 24:14
HeideggerDasein's condition is thrownness (Geworfenheit): it lands, with a kind of violence, in a time and place it never chose, with no before and no outside from which to consent. L12 · 31:33
Thrownness gives the always-already-in-the-world condition its violence and its facticity.
HeideggerNobody is thrown into an empty world. For Heidegger, other people belong to Dasein's situation from the outset, so existing in the world already means existing alongside others. L17 · 11:56
LevinasWhere Husserl started from subject and object and Heidegger from Dasein in its world, Levinas grounds ontology, epistemology and ethics alike in the face-to-face relation between self and other. L17 · 39:42
Shore presents Levinas as re-grounding everything one step further, in the self-other relation, after Husserl's subject-object bridge and Heidegger's always-already-in-the-world.
HeideggerDasein is no detached observer. It is always already being-in-the-world: doing things, caring about things, alongside other beings, with no outside position to withdraw to. L12 · 24:14
HorkheimerHeidegger's notion of care applies to social inquiry: we are already inside the world and it matters to us, so no neutral, detached, scientific stance toward it exists. L14 · 24:27
Takes "care": we are always already in the world, with no neutral standpoint
HeideggerDasein is no detached observer. It is always already being-in-the-world: doing things, caring about things, alongside other beings, with no outside position to withdraw to. L12 · 24:14
SartreIn his early Transcendence of the Ego (1937), Sartre rejects Husserl's phenomenological reduction on broadly Heideggerian grounds: always already in a world, we cannot bracket our belief in it. L13 · 19:10
Takes Heidegger's always-already-in-the-world to its anti-Husserlian conclusion: no reduction is possible.
HeideggerDasein is no detached observer. It is always already being-in-the-world: doing things, caring about things, alongside other beings, with no outside position to withdraw to. L12 · 24:14
KojèveFollowing Heidegger, Kojève replaces talk of nature or the world with le donné, the given: we are always already caught up in it, so no uninvolved standpoint exists. L16 · 13:49
Shore says Kojève, following Heidegger, holds that the world is never independent of Dasein; his "given" draws on Dasein always already being in the world.
HeideggerDasein is no detached observer. It is always already being-in-the-world: doing things, caring about things, alongside other beings, with no outside position to withdraw to. L12 · 24:14
FoucaultKnowledge is never innocent of power; the slash in power/knowledge marks their inseparability, which rules out disinterested inquiry and any neutral Archimedean point to stand on. L21 · 37:31
Shore hears echoes of Heidegger's observer problem in Foucault's claim that there is no neutral, innocent space outside power.
HeideggerDasein is no detached observer. It is always already being-in-the-world: doing things, caring about things, alongside other beings, with no outside position to withdraw to. L12 · 24:14
PatočkaTo be in the world from the outset is to be responsible for it from the outset; that responsibility goes everywhere with Dasein, an ontological trait, not a contingent tie. L25 · 43:29
Because Dasein is always already in the world, it is answerable for the world
Terms that appear in the same claims.