Forgiveness

Arendt forgave Heidegger, in Shore's reading, although he never asked; as to how, Shore points to her 1958 writing on forgiveness, in a book silently dedicated to him.

Put simply Shore: Arendt forgave Heidegger, even though he never asked. To see how, Shore points to what Arendt wrote about forgiveness in 1958, in a book she privately dedicated to him.

Forgiveness, for Arendt in The Human Condition, is the sole remedy for irreversibility: a deed cannot be undone, even when its doer had no way of knowing what it was.

Put simply Arendt: what is done cannot be undone, even when the person who did it could not have known what they were doing. Forgiveness is the only remedy for that.

Where to read it Arendt, The Human Condition §33.

In a 1997 essay, Derrida holds that forgiving, to have any meaning at all, must mean forgiving exactly what is unforgivable.

Derrida's aporia of forgiveness: because forgiveness forgives only what cannot be forgiven, it must declare itself to be impossibility as such.

Put simply Derrida: forgiveness only applies to what cannot be forgiven. So it is caught in a contradiction (an "aporia"): it must present itself as impossibility itself.

Krastev's reasoning: late in life Patočka's dissident circle mixed former Stalinists with victims of Stalinism, and he forgave those Czech friends; so, consistently, he would forgive Heidegger's Nazism too.

Put simply Krastev's argument: late in life, Patočka's dissident circle included both former Stalinists and their victims, and he forgave those Czech friends. So it would be consistent for him to forgive Heidegger's Nazism too.

Forgiveness alone among reactions is unpredictable: though a response, it keeps something of genuine action, starting afresh instead of being dictated by the deed that provoked it.

Put simply Arendt: forgiveness is the one response no one can predict. Though it answers a wrong, it acts afresh, like a new beginning, rather than being dictated by the deed that provoked it.