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A term · 6 claims · lectures 11, 13, 17

Phenomenological epoché / reduction

epoché (Einklammerung)

Suspending, not doubting, the question whether the world is real, so that things can be described exactly as they are given to pure consciousness.

The 6 claims that turn on it

In lecture order, as Marci Shore presents each view. The time opens that minute of the lecture on YouTube.

Lecture 11Phenomenology

The phenomenological reduction jolts us from the natural attitude, where the world's existence is taken for granted, into reflection on consciousness; the reality question is bracketed, suspended rather than doubted.

Put simply Husserl: normally we just assume the world exists, his "natural attitude". The "phenomenological reduction" jolts us out of that into examining our own experience. We set aside, or "bracket", whether things are real, without doubting it.

Phenomenology, both in Husserl's conception and largely in its later development, is more method than theory: an account of how we ought to go about understanding the world.

Put simply Husserl's phenomenology, and mostly what grew from it, is less a set of claims than a method: an account of how we ought to go about understanding the world.

Bracketing reached into Husserl's own life: weeks after the First World War killed his younger son, he wrote to a friend that the war was now bracketed.

Put simply Husserl's habit of "bracketing," setting a question aside, reached into his own life. Weeks after his younger son was killed in the First World War, he wrote to a friend that the war was now bracketed.

Lecture 13French Existentialism

In his early Transcendence of the Ego (1937), Sartre rejects Husserl's phenomenological reduction on broadly Heideggerian grounds: always already in a world, we cannot bracket our belief in it.

Put simply In an early work, Sartre rejects Husserl's method of setting aside our belief that the world is real. Following Heidegger, he says we cannot: we are always already caught up in the world.

In the text In The Transcendence of the Ego (1936–37; Williams and Kirkpatrick translation), Sartre applies Husserl's reduction to the ego itself: "the transcendent I must fall before the stroke of phenomenological reduction".

Lecture 17Husserl's Children, Searching for the Other

Husserl's reduction brackets whatever may or may not exist, other egos included; only my transcendental ego stays unbracketed. What remains is the sphere of ownness: what is mine.

Put simply Husserl's reduction asks me to put aside every question about what exists, other people included. Only my own "I" stays. What remains is my "sphere of ownness": whatever is given to me as mine.

Shore lines up four versions of one shaking moment: Heidegger's being-toward-death, Shklovsky's estrangement, Husserl's reduction, Levinas's face-to-face. For Levinas the jolt comes from the other, not from death.

Put simply Shore lines up four shaking moments that reveal something fundamental: facing death (Heidegger), seeing the familiar as strange (Shklovsky), setting assumptions aside (Husserl), meeting someone face to face (Levinas). For Levinas, it comes from another person, not death.

The questions it belongs to

Throughlines that pass through one of these claims.

Related terms

Terms that appear in the same claims.

natürliche Einstellung / phänomenologische Einstellung
natural attitude vs. phenomenological attitudeThe natural attitude naively assumes the world exists; the phenomenological attitude is a jolt into reflecting on what consciousness contains.
In-der-Welt-Sein / immer schon
being-in-the-world / always alreadyDasein is never outside the world looking in; it is always already involved in it, using things and living among others.
transzendentales Ich / empirisches Ich
transcendental ego vs. empirical egoThe empirical ego is the contingent, worldly self with its own history. The transcendental ego is the pure subject left after the epoché, the source of all sense the world has for me. In the lecture, a universal "I-ness" in everyone.
Eigenheit / Eigenheitssphäre
sphere of ownness (Eigenheitssphäre)Husserl's name for what remains once the reduction leaves only what is given as one's own, with other selves bracketed.
face à face
face-to-face (Levinas)Levinas's ultimate situation: meeting the other's face, which discloses their infinity and puts me in question.
Sein-zum-Tode
being-toward-death (Sein-zum-Tode)Human existence is finite and always heading toward death; authentic existence keeps this in view instead of fleeing it.
остранение
ostranenie (defamiliarization, estrangement)Making the familiar strange by laying bare the device, so perception wakes from automatized recognition into real seeing.