durée
Time as a continuous, irreversible, lived flow in which past and present interpenetrate, rather than a row of countable instants.
Grilled cheese: cut slices sit apart on the bread, then melt into one another when cooked, leaving no gaps or hard boundaries.
The image Shore uses for it, in our paraphrase.
In lecture order, as Marci Shore presents each view. The time opens that minute of the lecture on YouTube.
No general agreement exists on what Nietzsche meant by eternal recurrence; Shore suggests reading it, potentially, as eternal continuity: a river with no clean break between past and present.
Put simply Shore: no one agrees on what Nietzsche meant by "eternal recurrence". She suggests one possible reading: time as an endless flow, like a river, with no clean break between past and present.
It seems to Shore that Bergson never quite proves the link between free will and time's continuity; he suggests it, and even his clearest passage posits more than it proves.
Real time is durée, duration: time as we actually experience it, a flow with no gaps that runs one way only and resists being divided into countable points.
Put simply Bergson: real time is "durée" (duration), time as we actually live it. It flows without gaps, runs only one way, and cannot be split into countable points.
In consciousness, one state succeeding another means the two melt into an organic whole without gaps or edges, and the past keeps coexisting virtually with the present.
Put simply Bergson: in the mind, each state melts into the next, forming one whole with no gaps or edges (Shore's picture: cheese slices melting together in a grilled cheese). The past keeps living on in the present.
Shore hears something Hegelian in Bergson: the same longing for wholeness, where fragmentation counts as alienation and whatever is seamless ranks above whatever still shows its seams.
Put simply Shore hears an echo of Hegel in Bergson: the same longing for wholeness, where being in pieces counts as "alienation", not being at home in the world, and anything seamless ranks above what still shows its seams.
Free will is inseparable from qualitative time: because we live time as an undivided flow, we can act spontaneously, in ways no one could have fixed beforehand.
Put simply Bergson: free will cannot be separated from time lived as one unbroken flow. Because we live time that way, we can act spontaneously, in ways no one could have settled in advance.
Einstein's relativity theory measures time through instants, and that is the mistake: time must be flow, since only flowing time can accommodate contingency and free will.
Put simply Bergson against Einstein: relativity measures time as a series of instants, and that is the mistake. Time must be a flow, because only flowing time leaves room for an open future and free will.
In the text In the preface to Duration and Simultaneity (1922), Bergson presents the book as asking how far his idea of duration is compatible with Einstein's views on time.
1 link between claims that both use the term. Each shows the earlier claim, then the later one that answers it. “Our inference” marks a link Shore does not state outright.
BergsonFree will is inseparable from qualitative time: because we live time as an undivided flow, we can act spontaneously, in ways no one could have fixed beforehand. L7 · 23:13
BergsonEinstein's relativity theory measures time through instants, and that is the mistake: time must be flow, since only flowing time can accommodate contingency and free will. L7 · 25:48
The Einstein polemic is where the duration-freedom link is pressed against a physics of instants.
Throughlines that pass through one of these claims.
Terms that appear in the same claims.