How one subject relates to, knows and is with another subject, as opposed to how a subject reaches an object.
A die on the table: nobody sees all six faces, so classmates at other sides confirm one object; she applies it to writing histories from inside or outside one's group.
The image Shore uses for it, in our paraphrase.
In lecture order, as Marci Shore presents each view. The time opens that minute of the lecture on YouTube.
Shore frames intersubjectivity as a change of question: a long epistemological tradition worried about the gap between subject and object; now the issue is how one subject meets another.
Put simply Shore: for centuries philosophers asked how a mind can know the things around it. Here the question changes to how one person can truly meet another.
What Husserl's students share, in Shore's reading, is a discontent: his phenomenology seems to view other subjects as just variations of objects, and that came to feel impoverished.
Husserl's first route to other minds is epistemological: I grasp another ego by analogy with mine, and the result is a community of monads, each still self-contained.
Put simply Husserl's first answer to "how do I know other minds?": by analogy with my own. Each mind still stays sealed in itself, a separate unit (a "monad") among others.
Take a die on a table: from any single spot I see only some faces. Others standing elsewhere complete the picture, which is why knowledge, for Husserl, is intersubjective.
I have no direct line into anyone else's primordial experience. So for Husserl, another person counts as an existing other only insofar as my consciousness constitutes them as such.
Put simply Husserl: I can never live through another person's experience from the inside. So, for me, someone else is another person only because my own consciousness makes sense of them as one.
Links from these claims to others in the course. Each shows the earlier claim, then the later one that answers it. “Our inference” marks a link Shore does not state outright.
HusserlHusserl's first route to other minds is epistemological: I grasp another ego by analogy with mine, and the result is a community of monads, each still self-contained. L17 · 5:32
SteinOnly one body, mine, is lived from inside; other bodies reach me as exteriors. Empathy, by analogy and pairing, lets me take those exteriors as living bodies someone else inhabits. L17 · 25:33
Stein reaches another's living body by the same analogy and pairing that Husserl uses for other egos, but adds the body he leaves out.
HusserlI have no direct line into anyone else's primordial experience. So for Husserl, another person counts as an existing other only insofar as my consciousness constitutes them as such. L17 · 9:52
SartreSartre quickly spotted what was at stake, morally and existentially, in a thin conception of other people as mere objects of awareness; the other needed to be more than that. L17 · 31:17
Sartre sees moral and existential risk in Husserl's other, constituted in me as an object for my consciousness.
Throughlines that pass through one of these claims.
Terms that appear in the same claims.