Leib / Körper
The body felt from inside as one's own living body, versus a body seen from outside as an object among objects.
Touching your own hand feels different from touching someone else's: only one living body is ever experienced from inside.
The image Shore uses for it, in our paraphrase.
In lecture order, as Marci Shore presents each view. The time opens that minute of the lecture on YouTube.
Stein's objection to the transcendental ego is that it has no body. A subject, she insists, cannot be conceived as bodiless pure consciousness; philosophy has to reckon with embodiment.
Put simply Edith Stein's objection to Husserl: you cannot picture a person as a pure, bodiless consciousness. Any account of the self has to reckon with our bodies.
Shore insists you cannot make sense of Stein's sudden preoccupation with the body apart from her time in a wartime hospital among gruesomely wounded German soldiers.
Only one body, mine, is lived from inside; other bodies reach me as exteriors. Empathy, by analogy and pairing, lets me take those exteriors as living bodies someone else inhabits.
Put simply Stein: I feel only my own body from the inside; everyone else's I see from the outside. Empathy is what lets me see those bodies as people living in them, as I live in mine.
In the text In On the Problem of Empathy (1917), Stein rejects inference by analogy as an account of empathy; "pairing" is Husserl's term, from Cartesian Meditations §51.
Links from these claims to others in the course. Each shows the earlier claim, then the later one that answers it. “Our inference” marks a link Shore does not state outright.
HusserlHusserl's first route to other minds is epistemological: I grasp another ego by analogy with mine, and the result is a community of monads, each still self-contained. L17 · 5:32
SteinOnly one body, mine, is lived from inside; other bodies reach me as exteriors. Empathy, by analogy and pairing, lets me take those exteriors as living bodies someone else inhabits. L17 · 25:33
Stein reaches another's living body by the same analogy and pairing that Husserl uses for other egos, but adds the body he leaves out.
HusserlWhere Freud locates the essential self in what is most hidden, the transcendental ego is pure light: nothing in it stays concealed, and knowing is a matter of clear seeing. L11 · 45:42
SteinStein's objection to the transcendental ego is that it has no body. A subject, she insists, cannot be conceived as bodiless pure consciousness; philosophy has to reckon with embodiment. L17 · 22:15
Pure, bodiless, transparent consciousness is inadequate; the lived body must enter philosophy
Terms that appear in the same claims.